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THE ORIGIN OF THE RULE AGAINST UNJUST
DISCRIMINATION.*
Side by side with the common law obligation of public
servants to render service to all who apply and to render such
service for reasonable compensation, there admittedly now ex-
ists in America, apart from statute, the obligation to serve with-
out unjust discrimination either in the matter of rates or of
service; while in England, in rates, at least, and probably in the
matter of service, the same duty prevails. The two former ob-
ligations are of early origin, dating back to the Year Book
times, and have been recognized for centuries. As to the last,
the few-modern writers and cases which have entered upon an
investigation of its origin are at variance both as to whether or
not such a duty existed at the common law, and, if not, as to
the precise time when it made its appearance. It has been re-
garded by some as an ancient common law doctrine of which
the early statutes were merely declaratory, and passed "in abund-
ance of caution" merely to affirm "the common right to equal
justice which exists independent of such provisions",' -while
others have considered it a wrong recently recognized, but have
frequently disagreed as to the exact date of its origin.'
When we look to the early text-books to discover the views
of writers of these periods concerning the existence of such a
duty, we find a situation that is confusing, that abounds in con-
tradictions, and that as a whole sheds little light upon the prob-
lem. Among the English authorities, Chitty affirms the exist-
ence of the rule but al the cases cited in its support were de-
* This is the first of a series of articles by the writer dealing with cer-
tain aspects of the doctrine of unjust discrimination in its relation to public
servants,--including its origin, its scope at common law and under the statutes,
and certain problems involving the doctrine arising under the Interstate
Commerce Act and kindred legislation, which have seemed worthy of
investigation.
"Per Lewis, C. ., in Sandford v. Railroad Co., 24 Pa. 378 (1855). "The
supposed necessity for such provisions in charters granted in this country
and in England, proves nothing more than that the lawmakers of both coun-
tries were aware of the difficulty in holding large corporations to those com-
won obligations ot justice which individuals feel bound to acknowledge with-
out legislative enactment."
'Wyman, "Public Service Corporations" (911), VoL 2, Sec. ziaz
(123)
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cided under "equality clauses" which were statutory requirements
imposed by Parliament for the express purpose of securing
equality.8 Powell, in his Law .of Inland Carriers in i86i,'
after denying the existence of any obligation to charge equally,
later in his work states that unjust discrimination was probably
illegal independently of any statute. Other writers do not at-
tempt a discussion of the rule at common law, but consider it
only under the restrictive railway legislation.* The view of
Story in his treatise on Bailnents, the leading early American
authority on the subject, is interesting. In enumerating the
duties and obligations of common carriers the editor of the
seventh edition in z863 inserted this sentence: "And he has
no right to charge one higher rates than he serves others for."$
The editor of the eighth edition, seven years later, inserted the
opposite view at length:'
"But at common law a common carrier of goods is not under
any obligation to treat all customers equally. He is bound to accept
and carry for all, upon being paid a reasonable compensation. But
the fact that he charges less for one than another is only evidence
to show that a particular charge is unreasonable; nothing more.
There is nothing in the common law to hinder a carrier from carry-
ing for favored individuals at an unreasonably low rate, or even
gratis."
This was repeated in a note in the ninth edition in t878.
The development of the rule in England and in America
has been entirely distinct. In England the duty was enforced by
legislative action before a common law remedy for the abuse of
unjust discrimination had an opportunity to develop. In
America, in the absence of a statutory remedy, the common law
worked out a remedy more or less adequate, which was later to
be supplemented by statute. The origin of the duty in England
and in America will therefore be considered separately.
Chitty, "Carriers (1857), P. 71.
'Second ed., pp. =0 and 273.
' Walford, "Railways" (2d Ed.), (8so), p. 317.
' Story "Bailments," 7th Ed. Se. SO
' Id., th Ed., Sec. s.S.
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THE ORIGIN OF THE RULE iN ENGLAND.
Whether or not there existed prior to that time in England
a common law prohibition against unjust discrimination, we find
until the middle of the nineteenth century a singular and rather
significant absence of authority upon the subject. The doctrine
is conceded to be of recent origin, having its inception in the
latter half of the past century. The only earlier case in which
the problem was even suggested or adverted to is Lees v. Man-
chester & Ashton Canal Co., decided in r8o9.s By statute a
certain canal company was authorized to take tolls up to a cer-
tain maximum and to reduce them at a general assembly held
upon certain notice. A contract was made without calling a
general meeting, whereby in consideration that certain indi-
viduals would make cuts to convey water and- send all their
coal by the canal, they were to be allowed to use the canal at a
reduced rate, the company paying back a rebate. The plaintiff
brought suit to recover the rebate. The reporter states that the
questions were raised at the argument "whether the contract in
question were lawful within the provision and spirit of the canal
acts respecting the reduction of tolls . . . or as being a
partial reduction of tolls for the benefit of particular individuals
only, and not of the public." He states that the court considered
at the time that there was great weight in the last class of ob-
jections urged on the part of the defendants, and held the case
over for cnsideration on these grounds. Lord Ellenborough,
who delivered the opinion of the court, held the agreement void
because it was not made at a general meeting, and upon this
ground disposed of the case. He stated further, however, that
"they (the public) also have an interest that the tolls shall be
equal upon all; for if any are favored, the inducement to the
company to reduce the tolls, generally, below the statute rate is
diminished. But as it is sufficient in this case to say that this
bargain is not binding upon the company of proprietors, inas-
much as it abridges their rights in a way the statutes do not
warrant, it is unnecessary to give an opinion whether-it so inter-
is East 64 (ift).
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feres with the rights of the public, as to be on that ground also
void."
The opinion of Lord Ellenborough is most interesting, since
it suggests, at an early date, an argument founded upon public
policy that would justify a common law prohibition of unjust
discrimination entirely apart from statute, and also for the ad-
ditional reason that it represemts an isolated early instance of
the mention of this modern doctrine, which does not appear again
in the reported cases until half a century later. And in view of
the more modern development of the rule prohibiting unjust
discrimination, the reasons that would have influenced Lord
Ellenborough, had he been compelled to adopt such a rule to
attain the result he desired, are of interest in that they repre-
sent the attitude of a great legal mind upon the prohibition of
unjust discrimination, when a situation suggesting it first came
before the courts. It does not appear that he would have worked
out the problem on the theory that there exists an abstract right
on the part of every member of the public to enjoy equality
of treatment. The obligation on the part of public service
companies to serve for a reasonable compensation had long been
recognized, and the court here suggests that to permit certain
individuals to receive undue preferences, will diminish the in-
ducement which might otherwise be present to grant a general
reduction of the rates. He seems to suggest that there may
be a rate intrinsically unreasonable which is not so strikingly
and obviously disproportionate to the cost of service that an
effort to secure its reduction by legal process would be success-
ful. It is the same argument advanced in the debates in tl*
constitutional convention in Pennsylvania, in 1873, when the
clause prohibiting free passes was being discussed,-namely,
that such a system involves an expense which must in the nature
of things be borne by that part of the traffic which receives
* no favors. Furthermore, the granting of favors to individuals
would probably prove an effective method of quieting a power-
ful or restless opponent of rates that were intrinsically un-
reasonable. Both of these factors indicate the intimate relation-
ship which the prohibition of unjust discrimination. bears to the
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ancient obligation to serve for a reasonable compensation, and
this early case shows that the rule prohibiting unjust discrimi-
nation may be an outgrowth of the obligation to demand only
a reasonable compensation, and not an extension of the duty to
render service, as it is generally considered. Certainly its re-
lation to the former obligation, as this early case indicates,
is very intimate.
The exiitence or non-existence of a common law prohibi-
tion against unjust discrimination in England became for most
purposes of only academic importance at a very early date. Al-
most as soon as the incorporation of railroads began in that
country, there were inserted in the private acts of incorpora-
tion the so-called "equality clauses" providing for uniformity
of treatment and placing all patrons sinilarly situated upon an
equality in their relations with the railroad. The first of these
clauses appears to have been introduced during the fourth year
of the reign of William IV. After that date the custom of
inserting such clauses in railway charters became universal.
The early statutory protection in England against unjustly
discriminatory practices such as those which grew up in America
tinder an uncertain or ineffective common law rule, may perhaps
be accounted for by the precedents existing there in the earlier
canal and turnpike acts. The Act of 3 Geo. IV, in 1822, con-
tained a typical provision imposing a fine of five pounds for
the collection of a greater or less sum than the published toll,
the forerunner, possibly, of the penal clauses in the modem acts,
which have been thought necessary to render the remedy effec-
tive. The first important general statute upon the subject in
England was the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, passed
in 1845, which embodied in a single general statute the various
provisions that theretofore had been inserted in private acts
of inporporation. It provided for uniformity and equality of
rates, and though less explicit and comprehensive than the act
of 1854, it was calculated to serve the same purpose.
A search of the parliamentary debates during the period
in which the act was. under discussion in parliament fails to
disclose any debate upon the section making provision for such
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equality. It was adopted, apparently, without any general dis-
cussion. It is possible that during the years in which equality
clauses were the rule, the people had become so accustomed to
provisions of this character and understood their inherent jus-
tice so thoroughly that no objection was made to a general
provision of that kind. Or it is possible that a proposition so
obviously just and fair, even though not theretofore recognized
as a general principle of law apart from the specific mandates
of acts of incorporation, would fail to arouse serious objection
on the part of fair-minded legislators. The more natural con-
clusion, perhaps, from the absence of parliamentary debate,
would be that both the act of x845 and the earlier "equality
clauses" were, as many American cases have maintained, merely
declaratory of a common law rule of long standing: Although
carriage of goods by sea early became an important factor in
commercial life, the cases involving sea carriage throw no light
upon the subject under consideration until a comparatively re-
cent date. The law respecting sea carriers was usually said to
be the same as that applicable to carriers by land, the only differ-
ence being that in the case of sea carriers a somewhat broader
conception of "acts of God" prevailed. It was probably the
prevalence of the charter-party as a contract of affreightment
that deferred the litigation of ocean rates until a later date.
In view of that fact that the "equality clauses" in the early
charters of incorporation uniformly imposed an affirmative oh:
ligation to afford impartial service to all, the references in the
early cases in which these clauses were construed regarding the
state of the common law on the subject of unjust discrimination
are merely dicta. The earliest dictum occurs in Baxendale v. The
Eastern Counties Railway 9 in 1858, and this dictum is often cited
alone as authority for the proposition that no doctrine of the
common law required equality of rates, if the rates offered were
not inherently unreasonable. The case arose under an "equality
clause," and Willes, J., in the course of his opinion expressly
said: "It is unnecessary to consider how the matter would
stand at common law." In the course of the argument of the
"4 C B. (N. S.) 63 (1808).
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case, as it is reported, Williams, J., quoted an excerpt from the
note to Coggs v. Bernard in the fourth edition of Smith's Lead-
ing Cases"° which stated, apropos the obligations of common
carriers, that "the hire charged must be no more than a rea-
sonable remuneration to the carrier, and, consequently, not
more to one (though a rival carrier) than to another, for the
same service." Byles, J., thereupon said: "I know no com-
mon law reason why a carrier may not charge less than what
is reasonable to one person, or even carry for him free of all
charge"; and Willes, J., in his opinion, referred to the passage
from Smith's Leading Cases quoted above as "undoubtedly in-
accurately expressed."
Four years later in a case which likewise arose under an
"equality clause," a situation was presented where a com-
mon carrier had established certain rates for packed parcels
which were higher than the rates charged for small parcels. An
action was brought to recover for the exaction of rates alleged
to be excessive upon a shipment from Boulogne to London.
The court refused recovery on the ground that the contract had
been made in France, and as there was nothing in the icx loci
contractus which rendered the inequality illegal, no action could
be maintained. Mr. Chief Justice Earle, who delivered the
main opinion, justified the decision even if it were assumed
that the "equality clause" was applicable, on the ground that
it was a proper classification. Willes, J., after concurring in
an opinion in which he approved the grounds stated above, con-
cluded his own opinion with these words: "the obligation of
the carrier at common law being to charge reasonably, but not to
charge equally." 11 The decision was based on the ground first
stated; the further observation by Willes, J., is dictum.'
1P. 74-
Branley v. S. E. Railway Co, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 63 (1862).
"In Garton v. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co, i B. & S. 112 (i86t). it was
held that one charged a reasonable rate could not recover the difference
between his rate and that charged another in an action for money had and
received. Such actions involve the complicated question of the right to
recover money paid under a mistake of fact, and the case therefore did not
necessarily decide that an equal rate for the future could not have been coin-
nelled by ma.ndamus.
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In Great Western Railroad v. Sutton 13, decided in the
House of Lords in 1869, the question arose whether or not it
was proper to charge one engaged in the business of collecting
small packages and forwarding them in packed parcels a higher
rate than a wholesale dealer who shipped similar packages was
compelled to pay. A judgment in favor of the shipper, who
was the plaintiff in the case, was upheld by the House of
Lords. The case turned upon the determination whether or not
under an "equality clause" such a difference in rates was justi-
fiable, and the state of the common law upon the subject -as
entirely irrelevant. Mr. Justice Blackburn, however, at the
beginning of his opinion, in recounting the common law obliga-
tions of common carriers, said: "At common law a person hold-
ing himself out as a common carrier of goods was not under any
obligation to treat all customers equally," and further on, "There
was nothing in the common law to hinder a carrier from car-
rying for favored individuals at an unreasonably low rate, or
even gratis," citing as authority for this statement the dicta by
Byles, J., and Willes, J., in the two cases last referred to.
Speaking of "equality clauses," he says: "At first the legislature
in each special act inserted such clauses as seemed, to the par-
ticular committees, reasonable in each case. Very soon -those
iame to be the usual clauses which the then chairman of Com-
mittees of the House of Lords used to require to be inserted
in all railway bills with more or less modification. They were
known by his name as 'Lord Shaftsbury's clauses.' Finally, in
1845, the legislature embodied in a general act (8 & 9 Vict.
c. 20) those clauses which it was thought expedient should gen-
erally be inserted in railway acts."
It is natural that the early cases involving the subject of
unjust discrimination were almost invariably cases involving
preferences in rates or charges, rather than in facilities and ac-
commodations. The problem of unjust discrimination in its
acute and complicated phases is one that becomes of more fre-
quent and natural occurrence with the introduction of improved
"L TL 4 H. of L. 26 (869).
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facilities and accommodations, of tank and refrigerator cars, of
grain elevators and private sidings. It is interesting, therefore,
to note what appears to be the earliest case in which the problem
of discrimination in the matter of facilities was presented.
The alleged preferences included the supply of stationery
by the railroad to a certain coal company, and the use of rail-
road stations for advertising purposes. The favored company
was allowed to employ porters and clerks of the railroad, and
passes were given agents of the coal company. They were also
given a longer period to unload their cars without demurrage
charges, and in addition were given lower rates. The court
held that the guaranty of large shipments which the coal com-
pany undertook was sufficient to justify the difference, provided
the carrier was willing to enter into similar agreements with
others; and that the arrangement being made with a view to
profit for the carrier and not merely for the purpose of favor-
ing a particular shipper, the statutory requirement of equality
was not violated.1' . The strict construction adopted in applying
the "equality clauses" in many of the early cases constitutes
some evidence that there was no prohibition of anequal treat-
ment at common law."'
As has. been stated, courts and writers have differed widely
as to whether any rule against unjust discrimination existed at
common law in England. The writer has found one case, which,
it is submitted, raises the question squarely an I decides it. -It
is cited in a text book by Powell on The Law of Inland Car-
riers. The authorities usually cited in support of the non-exis-
tence of any common law rule against unjust discrimination are
"In re Nicholson & Te Great Western Railway Co, s C. B. (N. S.) 366
(z8sw).
31 In Attorney General v. The Birmingham & Derby Junction Ry., 2 Rail-
way & Canal Cases t24 (ig4o), the earliest case arising under an "equality
clause," the complaint was that passengers going from A to B were charged
8s, while passengers going from A to B and thence to C were only charged
2s., between A and B. The court refused to order the discontinuance of the
discrimination, holding that it was merely differences under circumstances
precisely similar that the "equality clause" was designed to prevent.
Whether the circumstances were .ufficiently dissimilar to justify a difference
in rate, the court did not inquire. This strict construction of the 'equality
clause" is some evidence of the non-existence of any prohibition of unjust
discrimination at common law.
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the dicta in the several cases mentioned above. While thcse are
often clear and positive, they occur in cases governed by other
considerations, and can rise to no higher dignity than dicta.
In Hungerford Market Company v. The City Steamboat
Company, s reported in the Law Journal Reports of i86z, the
court. faced the situation squarely. The Market Company was
authorized by a clause in the act under which it was incorporated
to take from every passenger landing or embarking from the
wharf which they were to erect, a toll not exceeding 2d. for each
passenger. The company, the plaintiffs in the case, charged
the A Steamboat Company, the defendant, a higher. rate per
passenger than they charged the B Steamboat Company. There
were no differentiating circumstances alleged as a justification
for the disparity in rates, nor did the rate charged the defend-
ant company exceed the maximum which the statute authorized.
The defendant, upon being sued for tolls, objected to paying
more than its rival, but recovery of the full amount was al-
lowed.
Mr. Chief Justice Cockburn, who delivered the opinion of
the court, after reviewing the facts of the case, said: "We
have, therefore, to consider whether a company entitled to
take tolls in return for a public service is bound independently
of express provision, to exact the same tolls from all persons
alike, or is at liberty, if so minded, to remit the tolls or any por-
tion of them to particular individuals, at its pleasure and dis-
cretion. No authority has been adduced for the former of
these jiropositions.17 ... The result, then, is that, in our opinion,
there neither arises upon these acts of parliament, nor exists at
common law, any obligation of this company to exact uniform
"30 Law Journal Reports 2S (186o); 3 EL & EL 36S.
"Continuing, the court said: "In Lees v. The Manchester & Ashton
Canal Company the observations of Lord Eflenborough go no further than
to show that, on grounds of public policy, it may be desirable that such an
obligation should attach to the power of a public company to take toll, yet
authority would certainly seem to be required to establish a proposition
directly at variance with the well-known axiom that every one is at liberty
to renounce a right established inhis favour. The power to take tolls is
conferred on the company in consideration of service to be rendered and the
accommodation afforded to the public. If the service be rendered, and the
accommodation afforded, the obligation of the company is fulfilled.*
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tolls, provided they keep within the amount fixed and appointed
conformably to the ii Geo. IV c. LXX, and that consequently
our judgment must be for the plaintiffs."
The court did not, in its opinion, cite the dictum of the earlier
case of Baxendale v. Eastern Counties Railway,'s nor did the
House of Lords in enunciating this doctrine by way of dictum
in 1869 " advert to this case. It having been established that
no statutory mandate compelled the imposition of equal rates
upon all users of the wharf, and it having been conceded that
the owners were engaged in public service, the 'question was
squarely raised whether or not, aside from any statutory pro-
vision, an obligation to charge equally was imposed by the
common law. The court decided flatly that no such duty existed.
In the argument of the case reference was made to the early
turnpike acts to prove that such a rule existed at common law.
In these acts express power was conferred upon the trustees
to compound with individuals or communities under certain
circumstances in the fixing of tolls,20 from which it might have
been inferred that in the absence of such express power to com-
pound, no authority to do so existed. But in the Hungerford
Case the court held that since in its operations as bridge owner
the company was by its statute of incorporation compelled to
charge equally, the failure of Parliament to insert a similar
clause in the act authorizing the erection of the wharf at a
time when such clauses were in common use, showed an intention
to relieve them of this restraint, and refused to accept the sug-
gestion of counsel that the compounding clauses in the early
turnpike acts implied a common law requirement of equality.
It may, therefore, be safely asserted, that under the com-
mon law in England no prohibition against unjust discrimina-
tion on the part of public service companies existed. When,
however, we regard the situation in its practical. aspect, apart
from legal authority, it is difficult to conceive that the obvious
injustice of such discrimination should have been allowed to
Supra, note 9.
- See supra, note 13.
- See 3 Gco. IV, c. z26, Sec. 42, and 4 Geo. IV, C. 95, SeCs. 12 and 13.
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continue with no remedy for redress. As early as the Year
Book times the regulation and supervision of public servants
had reached an advanced stage. The duty to serve for reason-
able compensation was very early established. Likewise the
obligation to serve all who applied for service was of ancient
origin.
The doctrine of unjust discrimination in its essence is not
primarily concerned with the intrinsic reasonableness of rates nor
with extortion; it is concerned rather with the question of rela-
tive equality and the fact that a favor to one results in injury to
another.
But in Lees v. Manchester & Ashton Canal Co.al the
earliest case in which a discriminatory situation was judicially
considered, the undoubted tendency of preferences to result in
.the creation of a general scale of rates intrinsically though per-
haps not obviously unreasonable, is considered of itself as proba-
bly a sufficient reason for their prohibition. Furthermore, at
the early law, one of the most cogent reasons mentioned by the
courts for the enforcement of the duty to serve was the injuri-
ous monopoly that would otherwise result. Such a situation
was regarded as prejudicial to the public welfare, and to permit
a single manufacturer or shipper to thrive in a field free from
competition owing to the refusal of a common carrier to serve
his rivals, was so obviously in contravention of public policy
that the early courts were not hesitant in applying the stamp of
disapproval. But if the courts believed that by requiring a ria-
sonable rate without any further restriction as to charges the
creation of monopolies could be prevented, subsequent history has
demonstrated their error. For within the limits of any non-
confiscatory maximum rate yet prescribed there is sufficient lee-
way for favoritism and unjust discrimination to create the very
monopolies that the common law abhorred. Impressed 9s they
were with this monopoly idea, it is hard to believe that the courts
would, especially during the early days of stringent public serv-
ice regulation, have permitted a carrier to charge one patron a
0 Spwm note 8.
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greater sum than it charged another for the performance of an
identical service, and under similar circumstances, even if it were
conceded that the higher sum was not unreasonable. One of
the most puzzling problems in the law of public service is the be-
lated appearance in the reported caset of the obligation to re-
frain from unjust discrimination.
It is during this period prior to the middle of the nineteenth
century when judicial expressions upon the subject of unjust
discrimination are wanting, that the economists' views of the
subject are of especial value. And as to conditions existing prior
to the year i87o the works on railroad economics are rather
vague. The belated regulation may have been due entirely, or in
part, to any of three causes.
Dr. Emory R. Johnson, in his excellent recent work on rail-
road economics, attributes it to the absence of competition
among the early carriers.2 2 So long as a carrier has a substantial
monopoly of the business of transportation there is no incentive
to favor one shipper at the expense of another, but as soon as
competition is encountered, concessions must be allowed to se-
cure patronage which would otherwise be diverted .tP a rival,
and the complaint against unfair discrimination arises. Not
until rail carriage became usual did the problem become acute.
In the case of passenger traffic, aside from the free pass abuse,
the situation has never become serious. Almost as soon as rail-
road transportation was introduced in England this obligation
was enforced by statutes; until that time the most plausible ex-
planation, perhaps, of the absence of any such obligation, is that
competition had not reached a state that required such a regula-
tion.
It may, also, have been due to the early attitude which did
not sanction interference, with freedom of trade and of -com-
mercial contracts, and to the general feeling that one should
be allowed to dispose of his commodities at his own price, free
from any outside interference approaching paternalism. It may
have been thought that to fix a maximum or reasonable rate
'Johnson: "American Railway Transportation," Ed. 1915.
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constituted a sufficiently serious interference with this freedom
of commercial conducL
A third possible explanation, in America, for its late ap-
pearance is that these discriminations were so well concealed
that their extent was not generally known, a circumstance which
may account for the absence of litigation. In the- period follow-
ing the year i87o when commissions of investigation were dis-
closing the extent of the widespread practice of granting re-
bates, the popular surprise at its prevalence indicates that the
full extent. of the abuse had not been fully appreciated by the
general public. These investigations disclosed, further, that in
many instances the contracts under which these preferences were
created specifically enjoined secrecy on the party of the second
part.
The work of many of the economists upon the subject is so
biased as to be of little value. Between those writers who main-
tain that railroads have never made a rate difference which was
not justified by some economic principle such as competition, and
that the early rate statutes are merely "statutory monuments of
ignorance and affected solicitude," 5' and those of the other
school who fail to see any but sinister motives behind every
rate inequality, there lies a broad field embracing many disputed
economic principles, and there exists a mass of information that
is interesting, contradictory, and unauthenticated. Save for a
few writers, the whole is marred by an ill-concealed partisan.
ship. In one view, however, there is a tendency to concur,
namely, that prior to the year 187o and the legislation of the
decade following there was at least no effective curb against
practices that were unjustly .lisciiminator4.6
"Kirkman: "Railway Rates and Government Control* (1892), p. 123.
See also Aeworth, "The Elements of Railway Economics" (z9os), p. z3L
"In Drinker's "The Interstate Commerce Ac." VoL z, p. 6o the defects
of the common law as a remedial weapon are indicated. The situation from
the point of view of the economist is ably and impartially summarized by
Professor Hadley in his work on "Railroad Transportation" (1886), p. 2:
"This condition of things became obvious about 387o; and it is against
these evils and dangers that the subsequent legislation has been almost
entirely directed. The years t870-3 are marked by a change in the aims of
railroad legislation, more obvious perhaps than the change in principles of
ORIGIN OF RULE AGAINST UNJUST DISCRIMINATION 137
The investigation, however, has disclosed that the legal
aspect of the problem is clear and free from doubt. However
strange it may seem that no such rule was developed, and des-
pite frequent statements by courts and writers to the contrary,
there was no prohibition of unjust discrimination at the English
common law.
THE ORIGIN OF THE RuLE IN AMERICA.
The cases involving the duty of railroads to grant accom-
modations to all express companies which apply for service will
be considered in a subsequent article. The basis of decision in
these cases does not essentially involve the true doctrine of un-
just discrimination. The earliest case dealing with this rule
in America is Fitchburg Railroad v. Gage,2 a case decided by
railroad management twenty years earlier. A noticeable thing about the
changes of legislation was the suddenness with which they made themselves
felt all over the world. Hitherto the object had been to secure rapid increase
of railroad facilities. With this end in view England allowed the utmost
freedom from restriction; and United States granted almost reckless sub-
sidies of land, or guaranteed bonds; on the continent of Europe some states
gave direct pecuniary assistance to private companies, other states built rail-
roads themselves. The most they feared was that the charges in general
might be too high, and this they sometimes sought to prevent by law. That
the community might be injured by the reduction of some charges more than
others scarcely entered the minds of the majority of legislators and states-
men. The very worst forms of discrimination were given by the state
railroads themselves, apparently without suspicion of harm.
-The reaction was. sudden and widespread. In the years immediately
following 1872, the Granger movement did its work in the United. States;
the Railway Commission was established in England; Belgium and Prussia
determined to change from a mixed system to a system of state ownership
pure and simple; France and Italy began a policy--eventually unsuccessful-
of state purchase and management. The general object was the same in
every case. Hitherto legislation had been conceived from the standpoint of
the investor-whether the investor was a private company or the state itself,
mattered little. Henceforward things were looked at from the standpoint
of the shipper, and especially of those shippers who under the old system
were being driven to the wall.
"It can hardly be doubted that the reaction was a healthful one in itself.
It is still more certain that it was often carried to an unfortunate extreme.
It is safe to say that a large part of the railroad legislation of the past twelve
years could never be carried out at all, and that a large part of the reinainder
would do more harm than good to all concerned. The attempt to legislate
for the shippers without regard to the railroads is as much of a mistake as
the attempt to legislate for the railroads without regard for the shippers.
To reconcile these two interests-apparently conflicting and yet mutually
dependent upon one another, is one of the most serious problems of modem
business or modern politics."
1 12 Gray (Mss.) 393 (8S9)
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the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1859. In that case an
action was brought by a railroad company for the recovery of
freight charges upon certain goods shipped by the defendant.
The defendant objected to the amount of the charges, not upon
the ground that they were inherently unreasonable or excessive,
but because freight was carried for others for a lower rate under
similar circumstances. Full recovery of the higher rate was al-
lowed.
It is highly significant that at the time this case was decided,
while it purported to follow the English common law, there were
at that time in England neither flat decisions nor clear dicta indi-
cating what the common law upon the subject of unjust discrimi-
nation was. This may therefore be regarded as the earliest case
in which the question of the existence of a common law obliga-
tion was passed upon either in England or in America. .The
language of Mr. Justice Merrick in the opinion has often been
quoted:
he recent English cases, cited by counsel for the defendants,
are chiefly commentaries upon the special legislation of parliament
regulating the transportation of freight on the railroads constructed
under the authority of the government there; and consequently
throw very little light upon questions concerning the general rights
and duties of common carriers, and are for that reason not to be
regarded as authoritative expositions of the common law upon
those subjects. The principle derived from that source is very
plain and simple. It requires equal justice to all. But the equality
which is to be observed in relation to the publie and to every in-
dividual consists in the restricted right to charge, in each particular
case of service, a reasonable compensation, and no more. If the
carrier confines himself to this, no wrong can be done, and no
cause afforded for complaint. If, for special reasons, in isolated
cases, the carrier sees fit to stipulate for the carriage of goods or
merchandise of any class for individuals for a certain time or in
certain quantities for less compensation than what is the usual,
necessary and reasonable rate, he may undoubtedly do so without
thereby entitling all other persons and parties to the same advantage
and relief."
Thus in the earliest American case the rule was laid down
that no common law prohibition of unjust discrimination ex-
isted, and it was assumed that the common law of England was
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in accord; although the precise state of the English law at that
time was not indicated in any reported case, and no authority
upon that point was cited. In laying down the broad doctrine,
the court did use the words "for special reasons" and Pin isolated
cases," suggestive of the "justifiable discrimination" of the later
common law, a situation in which an inequality of treatment-is
held to be justified in certain cases of dissimilarity of circum-
stances. But under the facts of the case as stated there appear
to have been no differentiating circumstances which would limit
the scope of the decision and the applicability of the broad
language of the opinion. The ratio decidcndi in the solution of
this problem when presented for the first time to an American
court seems to be the same as that adopted by the English courts
later in arriving at the same conclusion. Under the court's
method of reasoning, early authorities are cited defining the ex-
tent of the carrier's obligations to the public, wherein the duty
to serve all indifferently and for a reasonable remuneration is
emphasized. It seems then to have been inferred by the court,
although it is not-expressly so stated, that this enumeration of
the obligations of carriers in the early authorities was exclusive,
and that therefore no restriction of unjust discrimination existed.
Whether at any time the duty to serve impartially may have been
tacitly accepted as a necessary corollary to the well-recognized
duty to serve all who applied, or whether, as these early cases
indicate, regulation had not advanced to such a stage that this
obligation became a common law duty, must remain a matter for
speculation. Upon either theory, the long-continued absence
of judicial reference to the subject-is explainable.
The case usually cited as the earliest departure from the
rule announced in Fitchburg Railroad v. Gage, and the one gen-
erally supposed to have first laid down the rule against unjust
discrimination in America is Messenger v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road,26 decided by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey in 1874. A shipper of goods sued to recover certain re-
bates on goods shipped which the railroad had promised to re-
"8 Vroom (N. J.) 53t (874).
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mit. The court refused recovery, saying that a common carrier
could not legally give "unequal preferences," and said that this
rule had been laid down by the cases at common law in America.
The precise ground of decision in the early cases involving the
rights of express companies-upon railroads, before referred to,
here becomes important, as this leading early decision relies
upon the authority of these previous cases, which involved an
entirely distinct obligation, as the- sole authority for the rule
that it announced. 7 The court concludes that at common law
there is "necessarily implied a duty on their [the carriers']
part, and a right in the public, to have fair treatment and im-
munity from unjust discrimination."
Although the Messenger Case is quite generally cited as the
turning point in the American common law, at which it departed
from the rule of the Gage Case, a common law rule prohibiting
unjust discrimination had, in fact, become well established in
America several years earlier. It is rather notable that none
of the earlier cases except those involving the rights of express
companies were cited by the court to sustain its conclusion, since
there existed authorities perfectly apposite that were not re-
ferred to.
It is here proposed to consider chronologically those cases
decided prior to the Messenger Case wherein the illegality of
unjust discrimination was recognized, and wherein the true be-
ginnings of the common law prohibition of unjust discrimina-
tion in America are discermble.
The earliest of these cases antedates by two years the fa-
mous Gage Case, in which the existence of any such duty was
denied.2 In this case a railroad regulation provided that a cer-
tain excess fare should be charged when passengers neglected
to purchase tickets before boarding trains. The plaintiff refused
to pay the excess and being ejected from the train, sought re-
covery from the railroad. The regulation was held valid.
OfNew England Express Co. v. Maine Central R. R. Co., 57 Me. :88
(1869); McDuffee v. R. R., 52 N. H. 430 (j873); Sandford v. Railroad, 24
Pa. 378 (z8g5). The court also cited Audenried v. P. & IL . I., 68 Pa. 37o
(1871), which is not an "express' case and only by a very general dictum
supports the decisioa.
'aC. & & Q. R. IL v. PtA z8ll. 46o (457).
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In its opinion the court emphasized the fact that additional
trouble was caused and an increased service reqhired of the. rail-
road in such cases. and seems to have justified the excess charge
as a reasonable remuneration for this extra service required. But
Mr. Justice Caton, in the course of his opinion, announced, by
way of dictum, the rule against unjust discrimination, which,
though mere obiter, has an interest as the earliest pronounce-
ment of the rule in the American common law. The court said:
"These charges, however, must be uniform; that is, the charge
should be the same for all persons similarly situated, and for all
freights of a like kind and quality for a given service," and
further on, "they may not say that they will charge A twice
as much as they do the public in general." Then follows a sen-
tence at odds with the preceding. and containing a contradiction
within itself: "While they show favor to individuals or classes,
by carrying them free or for half price, if they choose, they can-
not be allowed to arbitrarily oppress an individual, by charging
him an unusual price, simply because it is him." It is possible
that the last sentence was meant to suggest the wholly discredited
idea that there is a difference in legal principle between arbitrarily
allowing A greater privileges than other members of his class, an
"undue preference," and capriciously denying to B privileges
which the fellow members of his class are permitted to enjoy,
sometimes called in contradistinction an "unjust discrimination."
The first statement constitutes a statement of the law substanti-
ally as it was laid down in the Messenger Case some years later.
But in the latter case it was not referred to.
The first case in America in which the question was squarely
raised and the rule against unjust discrimination laid down is
Twells v. Pennsylvania Railroad," decided by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in 1863. That this early. case dealing
with the problem was not cited in the later cases wherein the
identical problem was treated as res nova in the American law,
is probably due to the fact that either through accident or be-
cause it was marked "not to be reported" it was omitted from
n 2 Walkcr (Pa.) 45o (i86).
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the Pennsylvania reports of that year, and it was first made
available upon the publication of Walker's collection of unre-
ported cases in x8go.
The railroad had established a higher rate from Pittsburgh
to Philadelphia upon- freight- sent by the-complainant which was
intended for further shipment to New York, a point beyond its
terminus, than when Philadelphia was its final destination. It
was not contended that the higher charge was inherently un-
reasonable; it was merely urged that the fact that the ultimate
destination of the freight was beyond the carrier's line did not
create a dissimilarity of circumstances upon which an inequality
of rates could properly be predicated. The court held that the
discrimination was unjustifiable. After enumerating some of
the dluties of common carriers, Mr. Justice Strong concludes
with the mention of the duty to transport "at rates of com-
pensation that are alike to all." The court by way of.dictum
suggests that an inequality or special concession may be justified
if in allowing it the carrier has only its own interests in view
and does not act out of a desire to- favor any certain shipper.
Precisely the same doctrine crept in under the English equality
clauses, and if these legislative efforts did not exclude it, it is
not surprising that the common. law hesitated in prohibiting a
preferential arrangement which to the carrier represented a
sound and wise economic policy. It is this view that, consist-
ently adhered to, would justify the application of the so-called
"wholesale principle" in freight rates to its. fullest extent, per-
mit tle large shipper to eliminate his smaller competitor, and
justify a difference of charge, based upon competition, to two
shippers in the same city, one of whom is so situated that he
can secure switch connection with a rival railroad. This con-
servative attitude on the part of the court in circumscribing the
rule is characteristic throughout the early history of the rule
prohibiting unjust discrimination, but it was not destined to
survive.
Tie court cites no authorities directly sustaining its posi-
tion, seeming to accept without question the obligation to refrain
from unfair preferences. After mentioning the charter under
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which the railroad company was authorized to become a car-
rier and the powers given thereunder, the court says: "It is
admitted thal in the exercise of these powers they must treat
all alike." Whether the court was of opinion that under the
charter the railroad became more than a public servant, a quasi
state agency which from its very nature must treat all alike, does
not appear, although the opinion clearly seems to indicate that
the duty was one incident to public service. Referring to the
special provisions of the English charters specifically enjoining
equality, the court said that these were merely declaratory of the
common law, and cited Sandford Y. The Railroad."
The next case involving the rule also arose in Pennsyl-
vania. one year later." Here the complaint was that the rail-
road charged a lowet rate on freight shipped from Pittsburgh
to Philadelphia than it charged for an identical service when the
freight started from a point outside the state, in this case, at
Wheeling. The discrimination was a part of a general policy on
the part of the railroad to facilitate the movement of intra-
state commerce, since the State of P ennsylvania had imposed a
tonnage tax upon freight originating within that state, the effect
of which was to place Pennsylvania shippers at a serious dis-
advantage in competing markets. The avowed purpose of the
rate difference in this case was to compensate for the tonnage
tax and place the local shippers upon an equal footing with those
outside the state boundaries.
The difference in rates was upheld by the court. The re-
duction of the rates upon local freight had been brought about
by a mandate of the legislature in the Commutation Tonnage
Act of 1861,12 which, realizing the limitations imposed by the
federal constitution, wisely refrained from any attempt to pre-
scribe interstate charges. So far as the usual justifications of
discrimination are concerned, such as variances in the cost of
service or competition, the difference in rates here sustained was
entirely capricious and arbitrary Yet in the decision of the
"24 Pa. 378 (i85s).
"Shipper v. P. R. R., 47 Pa. 388 (1864).
'Ac of Mar. 7. i8bi. P. L 88, Sec. 2.
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court the rule against unjust discrimination is clearly recognized.
Citing Sandford v. Railroad," the earliest of the "express"
cases, the court holds that the English "equality clauses" wpre
merely declaratory of the common law, and says that there is
implied in the power given the carrier to establish reasonable
rates the requirement that these rates must be "fixed, equal, and
impartial." In holding that this discrimination in favor of local
traffic was justified, the court said that while equality under the
same circumstances was required, a discrimination based upon
the place of production of the commodity was not necessarily
an unjust one.
There is discernible in this case the conservative attitude,
corresponding to that of the early English courts, in adopting
a strict and narrow application of the requirement of equality.
The distinction is made between unequal treatment of indivdual
and of localities. It is quite natural that the injustice of the
former should have been first recognized. When A and B liv-
ing in the same city are charged unequal rates for identical serv-
ices rendered by a common carrier, or where services are rend-
ered under circumstances not identical, but on the other hand not
substantially dissimilar, and unequal charges are imposed, the
discrimination is obvious. But when A and B, lizing in differ-
ent cities, are charged by the same carrier unequal rates to a
third pity, X, under circumstances substantially similar, the un-
just discrimination, while as destructive and indefensible, is a
little less obvious and striking. Even today, under modern
statutes, competition may justify a discrimination between lo-
calities; between individuals, it cannot. While the court had
a perfect conception of the injustice of preferences among indi.
viduals, it does not appear to have recognized that a discrimina-
tion among localities could be illegaL Speaking upon this point,
the court says:
"In no just sense can the adoption and enforcement of a rate
of tolls for the transportation of merchandise which is the subject
of domestic trade carried in the prosecution of such trade, and a
different rate for similar articles imported and carried in the con-
'Supra, note 30.
ORIGIN OF RULE AGAINST UNJUST DISCRIMINATION 14S
duct of a foreign or extraterritorial trade, be regarded as a discrira-
ination between individuals. The benefits of reduction on domestic
trade are extended to all persons alike, and the burdens upon that
which is not domestic are imposed equally upon a:L"
The next case which involved the rule appeared in Illinois
four years later.34 A statute of that state made it unlawful for
a railroad comrany to deliver grain at any warehouse other
than the one to which it was consigned, without the consent of
the owner or consignee. The railroad, while delivering grain
at a certain other warehouse without additional charge, de-
manded five dollars per car in addition to'the regular rate for
delivery at the warehouse of the plaintiffs. A petition for an
irjunction against the exaction of this charge was granted. The
bill contained an averment that the charge for delivery was
intrinsically excessive and unreasonable, but the court in its
opinion did not advert to the inherent reasonableness of the rate.
It said: "As to the right of the company to impose the extra
charge of five dollars, on the ground that it is performing addi-
tional service, it need only be said that a railway company, al-
though permitted to establish its rates of transportation, must do
so without unjust discrimination as to individuals," ad enjoined
the carrier from "imposing upon them (the plaintiffs) an addi-
tional charge for such delivery, beyond what it imposed upon
other warehousemen." Here again the broad rule against unjust
discrimination is laid down; and again the case is treated like
one of first impression, none of the earlier cases or dicta being
cited.
In the year i870 two cases of importance in tracing the
origin of the rule were decided, one of them by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, reported in the Legal Gazette of that.
year and not included in the official reports.2 5 In this case Mr.
Justice Agnew charged that the carrier was bound to carry the
coal of the complainant at a rate as low as the carrier was at the
same time chargLig the "niost favored operators" for coal car-
ried between the same points. While accepting. the rule as a
be Vincent v. The Chicago & Alton R. R., 49 11. 33 (1868).
*Coal Co. v. Railroad Comrpany,2 Legal Gazette (Pa.) U9 (187o).
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common law proposition, the court held that it did not preclude
the possibility of a minimum charge, which was a discrimination
founded upon sound principles and not unjusL
In the same year'Chicago & Northern Railway v. People,3
an Illinois case, presents the first instance in America where the
problem of discrimination in the matter of facilities as dis-
tinguished from rates, was raisecL The complaint was that the
railroad had refused to deliver grain in bulk at the elevator of
the plaintiff, while it made such deliveries for others, and a
mandamus was sought to compel delivery at the plaintiff's ele-
vator. Since a statute had rendered such delivery obligatory,
as indicated in the Vincent Case,"7 it is questionale whether
that portion of the court's opinion dealing with the common law
upon the subject of unjust discrimination can rise to a higher
dignity than dicta. The court, while recognizing the effect of
the statute, is emphatic in its opinion that independently of this
legislative direction, an equivalent common law obligation would
exist. The court's language is worth quoting.J '
"Regarded merely as a common carrier at common law, and
independently of any obligations imposed by the acceptance of its
chdrter, it would owe important duties to the public, from which
it zould not release itself, except with the consent of every person
who might call upon it to perform them. Among these duties, as
well defined and settled as anything in the law, was the obligation
to receive and carry goods for all persons alike, without injurious
discriminations'as to terms, and to deliver them in safety to the
consignee, unless prevented by the act of God or the public enemy.
These obligations grew out of the relation voluntarily assumed by
the carrier toward the public, and the requirements of public policy
t"egarded then merely as a common carrier at common aWO,
the respondent should not be permitted to say that it will deliver
goods at the warehouse of A and B, but will not deliver-at the
warehouse of C, the latter presenting equal facilities for the dis-
charge of freight, and being accessible on respondent's line."
It is noteworthy that the court did not seek to enforce the
'06 1l. 365 (0).
a SOMr, not 34.
"At p. 37.
=1talks not found in orina
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duty as a part of the carrier's "duty to serve" but emphasized
the discriminatory feature, the fact that service -as accorded
to others similarly situated. As the first clear case of discrim-
ination in facilities in America, this decision occupies an impor-
tant place in the history of the origin of the rule against unjust
dliscrimination.
The constitution adopted in Illinois in 187o empowered the
general assembly to pass laws to prevent "unjust discrimination"
by railroads.'0  In Chicago & Alton Railroad v. People,
4 in
;873, Mr. Chief Justice Lawrence held that an act providing
for equal charges for equal distances was prohibitive of all differ-
ences and not merely of "unjust discriminations" as the con-
stitution had authorized; but it was further stated that since
unjust or unreasonable discrimination was prohibited by the
common law, subject to which all railroad charters were ac-
cepted, the charter rights of the railroad would not be infringed
nor the contract impaired by an act prohibiting unjust dis-
crimination.
From the foregoing analysis it is apparent that the com-
mon law rule prohibiting unjust discrimination had become es-
tablished in America several years prior to the Mcsscnger Case
in 1874.- Curiously enough, however, in the Messenger Case
none of this earlier authority is referred to, and the only au-
thorities therein cited stand for an entirely different principle.
It was about this time that the clamor for regulation
and legislative enforcement of the rule arose. One by one the
states adopted legislative measures varying in severity and effici-,
ency, which were immediately lauded and denounced respectively
by the opposing schools of economists. However well estab-
lished the common law prohibition against unjust discrimina-
tion may have been, practical difficulties in its application and
enforcement created the demand for a more efficient method
through the avenue of legislation. One fact, however, is to be
emphasized, as it is commonly overlooked or denied. It was not
O Art. XI, $¢c is5.
"67 IL 11 0873).
"Messenger v. P. I. IL, supm note 26.
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due to any defect in the theory of the common law that the need
for a statutory remedy arose. The American common law had
deveroped a perfectly efficient theory, which has been taken over,
uniformly in substance and frequently in its precise phraseology.
the term "unjust discrimination," in the modern statutes. It
was rather the inadequacy of the common law processes and the
absence of any such administrative tribunals as the commis-
sions of today for the enforcement of the duty in complicated
situations, that created the need for legislation.
In the meantime, side by side with the statutory regulation,
the development of the common law rule continued uninter-
rupted.48 Arbitrary discriminations by public servants not in-
cluded within the new acts gave rise to a great body of com-
mon law upon the subject and repeated reiterations of the rule."
A comparatively recent case deserves attention because in it
the rule against unjust discrimination was based upon a novel
ground."5 A gas company was engaged in supplying light to the
residents of a town under the authority of a town ordinance
which prescribed the terms under which such corporations might
lay and maintain pipes in the streets, and provided that it should
have the right if -it furnished a meter, to charge "any con-
sumer" according to a certain rate. One consumer complained
that the company would furnish him gas only on the meter
basis, while "flat rates" were offered to other consumers. The
court held that under the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution neither the state
nor its municipal subdivisions had power to authorize or permit
'In Hays v. P. R. R., 12 Fed. 3o9 (882), and Samuels v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., 31 Fed. s7 (887), the rigor with which the rule was applied is well
illustrated. In the former case quantity as a justification for i nton
*as repudiated; in the latter, the immateriality of the reasonableness of the
higher of unequal rates was emphasized.
I Typical cases are those involving tank cars, State v. C. N. 0. & T. P.
Ry. Co., 47 Ohio 3o (i8go); gas companies, Owensboro Gaslight Co. v.
Hildebrandxg Ky. Law Rep. 983 (801); electric companies, Snell v. Cin-
ton Elect Light Co., z96 Ill. 626 (xgoa); Armour Packing Co. v. Edison
EleM. Ilum. Co, 1i5 App. Div. (N. Y.)si (19o6); water cempanles, Griffin
v. Water Co., x22 .C. 2o6 (1898); sewers, Mobile v. Brevie Water Co.,
13o Ala. 379 (xgoo).
0lndiana, etc., Gas Co. Y. State, x58 lad. St6 (3go1).
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arbitrary and burdensome discriminations between its inhabit-
ants in the conduct of a business public in character. An ordi-
nance could not, therefore, constitutionally authorize the exac-
tion by a public servant of a certain rate from "any consumer,"
if that rate involved an arbitrary discrimination, since a state
cannot clothe its subdivisions with power to evade a constitu-
tional amendment. The case apparently conceives the duty to
refrain from unjust discrimination to be one imposed by the
amendment, or it at least decides that the amendment has made
the common law prohibition unalterable. Whether under this
theory a public servant operating without franchises of any
kind would be similarly restrained is questionable. Certain it is
that to call such a servant a state agency or a quasi state agency,
even where a franchise is present, is far-fetched.
The point raised here appears never to have been decided
elsewhere. If the view is sound, it opens up a horde of strik-
ing and practically interesting possibilities. If freedom from
unjust discrimination is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment,
an alleged infringement of this right involves a fedeial question.
To mention a sitigle illustration, may a shipper who alleges un-
just discrimination, when the decision of the state court of last
resort is adverse, appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States on the ground that a federal right has been violated? It
has not been attempted. There is little probability that it would
succeed.
While the rule against unjust discrimination was growing
up at common law, some courts were arriving at the desired end
by an indirect method. If two shippers under identical or sub-
stantially identical circumstances are given unequal rates, the
natural inference is that the lower rate is remunerative and that
therefore the higher must be excessive. This is not necessarily
true. But it was quite natural that where such an inequality was
shown to exist it should be accepted by the courts as some M-
dence, at least, that the higher rate exceeded the privilege of
reasonable compensation. It was likewise natural that there
should have been a desire on the part of some courts to enforce
the right to equal treatment through the obligation to serve for
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reasonable compensation, a duty long-established and univers-
ally recognized, rather than through the medium of the rule
against unjust discrimination, more recent of origin and of
more dubious ancestry. As early as the case of McDuffee v.
Railroad,4s in z873, it was said by way of dictum that such in-
equality might be evidence tending to show that the higher charge
was excessive. .This suggestion was seized upon by several
courts which, though reluctant to accept the lately recognized
common law rule against unjust discrimination, sometimes out
of deference for the early English dicta, were nevertheless anxi-
ous to reach its result, even by indirection. The climax of what
might be called the legal hypocrisy of this attitude, is reached in
Cook v. Chicago, etc., Railway,47 where, after stating that in-
euality of charges is only evidence to show that the higher rate
is unreasonable, which is a perfectly legitimate inference, and
after further quoting authorities to the effect that no obliga-
tion to refrain from unjust discrimination exists at common
law, the court cites with approval Redfield on Law of Rail-
roads " to the effect that "carrying for reasonable compensa-
tion must imply that the same compensation is accepted always
for the same service, else it could not be reasonable, either abso-
lutely or relatively." It concludes that the only finding that can
in fairness be made is that, after deducting the rebate, the rate
was reasonable. Thus the court, in its zeal to enforce equality
of rates, had given what was originally a bit of evidence the
force of a conclusive presumption. The reasoning is ridiculous.
The lesser rate may either as a matter of favor or of business
policy have been placed below the rate necessary to secure a
reasonable return, and to compel an uniform application of the-
lower rate may amount to unconstitutional confiscation. The
reasonableness of the rate depends upon considerations that are
intrinsic rather than relative. It is in the field of relative equality
that the rule against unjust discrimination has its application.
s2 N. IL 43o (z83).
E8 1a. 551 (189o).
*Val.a 2 P. 9S .
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It were far better if the court had recognized this and accepted
the rule.
It cannot be said that the enforcement of.equality of rates
under the presumption of the unreasonableness of the higher
rate represents a distinct intermediate step in the development of
the rule against unjust discrimination, as has sometimes been
supposed. When that suggestion was first made in the Mc-
Duffee Case, in x873, the common law rule had been fully
worked out and applied by some of the American courts, though
its recognition was not quite general, and a year later the fa-
mous Messenger Case 49 affirmed the rule. The cases decided
on the theory that the higher of two unequal rates is presump-
tively unreasonable all arose later and represent an indirect at-
tempt to attain the end of the rule against unjust discrimination
by-courts reluctant to accept it after it had become thoroughly
established.' 0
In spite of all this authority to the contrary, some courts
even in recent times have declared that no common law obliga-
tion to refrain from unjust discrimination exists, and have cited
Fitchburg Railroad v. Gage,31 decided in Massachusetts in z859,
wherein the existence of any such obligation was denied. It re-
mains, therefore, to determine the precise extent to which that
view has received sanction in the American common law. How
few of the cases, usually cited as having adopted the rule of the
Gage Case, which actually support the broad principle there laid
down, will appear presently.
Of these decisions, that in Johnson v. Pensacola Ralroad s2
is the earliest and easily the most carefully considered. In this
"mSupra, notes 26 and 42.
"Mr. Wyman, in his work on "Public Service Corporations6m refers to
what he calls a "later rule against unreasonable difference? as an inter-
mediate step between the rule of the Gage case and the modern rule pro-
hibiting unjust discrimination. Vol. 2, See. 123. In view of the 4t of
Twells v. Penna. R. R. and the other early cases already cited, it seem safe
to assert that the rule, in its present common law form, arose full-fledged,
however closely the scope of its application, at the early law, may have been
circumscribed. A number of modem cases exhibiting the same tendency are
collected under Sec. z286 in the same volume.
ft 12 Gray (Mass.) 393 (1859).
- 6 Mi. 6n (t878).
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case lower rates on lumber were given to certain shippers in con-
sideration of certain money lent to the railroad and a certain
volume of shipping supplied. A shipper sued to recover the
amount of freight he had paid in excess of what he would have
paid under the rates allowed favored shippers. After citing the
Gage Case and approving the statement therein that the common
law obligation of carriers extends to the reasonableness of the
rates only, and not to their equality, the court, in distinguishing
the Messenger Case, was careful to say that there unequal rates
were prohibited under the same drcumstances, while in this case
the declaration did not allege that the conditions were identical.
The court further said that for all that appeared in this case the
difference in rates might be justified by the amount of freight
to be furnished by the parties, or other circumstances might
render the conditions dissimilar, and upheld the discrimination.
As a makeweight to bolster up its decision from the point of view
of practicability, the court pointed out the inconvenience of a
rule whereby a shipper who was unfairly treated might look
about to discover the most favored shipper and recover accord-
ing to the difference in the rates given them; the extent of the
recovery would in effect be determined by the success attending.
such a search. Aside from the fact that the difficulty of arriv-
ing at a practicable measure of damages is not insuperable, and
should not prevent the enforcement of a right to equality, if pub-
lic policy recommends it, would the court have compelled by
mandamus the imposition of equal rates in the future, if re-
quested? In that case, at least, the praitical objection would
not be present.
A case often erroneously supposed to adhere to the doctrine
of the Gage Case was decided four years later s Here, again,
an attempt was made to recover the excess where ope shipper
was charged more than another. After stating that the English
rule permitted all discrimination, while in America unjust dis-
crimination was prohibited, the court employs certain expres-
sions indicating an adherence to the former view. Thus it says:
nRagan Y. Aiken, 9 Lea. (Tenn.) 6og (S882).
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"A reasonable price paid by such a party is not made unreasona-
ble by a less price paid by others," and quotes the English dictum,
"The charging of another party too little is not charging you
too much." s
The true ratio de'cdendi of the court appears in the con-
cluding paragraph:
"If the charge on the goods of the party complaining is reason-
able and such as the company would be required to adhere to as
to all persons in like condition, it may, nevertheless, lower the
charge of another person if it be to the advantage of the company.
not inconsistent with the public interest, and based on a suff.i"at.
reason.Ps It is obvious that the intention of the defendant, in this
instance, was not to discriminate against the complainants in favor
of any persons of the same place and in the same condition.. His
object was to get business for his road from persons at a. distance
from its terminus, which otherwise would reach their destination by
a different route. Under the circumstances, we cannot see that
the contracts complained of are against public policy, or that the
complainants have been damaged, if the charges on their goods were
reasonable."
The presence of competition was expressly emphasized as a
justification of the discrimination, in view of which it was neither
unjust nor undue. Under its facts the case cannot be said to
follow the Gage Case.
In two successive decisions in South Carolina the rule of
the Gage Case was applied. In the first" it was mentioned
casually that the inducement was necessary in order to secure
the freight for the carrier, a distinguishing fact, but this point
was not emphasized. Quoting from the Gage Case and the
Johnson Case, above referred to, the language of the opinion is
broad enough to justify preferences under circumstances that
are identical A few years later the proposition-was affirmed
without discussion by the same court.
Another case often referred to as supporting the doctrine
-'Garton Y. B. & . R. L, I B. & S. 112 (1861), "urn note i.
n Italics not found in original.
"Ex Parte Benson & Co., x8 S. C. 38 (882).
SAvinger Y. South Car. Ry., 29 S. C. 26S (1888).
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of the Gage Case dearly came to the opposite conclusion.5 8 A
section of the Colorado constitution prohibited "undue and un-
reasonable discrimination" by railroad companies, yet under it
a contract allowing rebates to a favored shipper was upheld. It
was said that it did not constitute unjust discrimination because
it was not an exclusive contract and did not in terms prevent the
allowance of similar privileges to others; and the specious dis-
tinction between a favor allowed to an individual which is de-
nied to others, and denying a certain individual privileges which
others are permitted to enjoy, was apparently approved. But
although it cited the Tennessee, Florida, and South Carolina
cases heretofore referred to, the court also recognized the rule
prohibiting unjust discrimination, and the Messenger Case, even
though it may not have properly applied it. Nowhere, perhaps,
is the confusion inevitably resulting from the use interchange-
ably of the terms "discrimination" and "unjust discrimination,"
better illustrated. In arriving at the conclusion that absolute
equality was not imperative the courts found little difficulty. Cer-
tain differentiating circumstances would justify a difference or
inequality. This absence of any obligation to preserve an abso-
lute equality came to be termed, loosely, the right to "discrimi.
nate," and it was inaccurately stated by some courts that there
was no rule against "discrimination." This confusion of "justi-
fiable discrimination" with "unjust discrimination," resulting
from the designation of both by the appellation, "discrimina-
tion," frequently led to the belief that the door to all kinds of
discrimination had been opened. It is true that the Gage Case,
with full knowledge of the consequences, went to that extent.
But most of the cases which have purported to follow it lay
down a much narrower principle.
As late as x892 the Supreme Court of Californi was con-
fronted with a case of rebating accompanied by no justifying
circumstances, and held that such conduct was not prohibited by
the common law.5 The court recognized the divergence of
"WBayles v. Kansas Pacific Ry., 13 Colo. 81 (889).
"Cowden v. Pacific Steamship Co., 94 Cal. 47o (xS9a).
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opinion upon the subject in America, in view of which it pre-.
ferred to follow the early English view. At this time, however.
the rule had become firmly established in America, having the
support of a great wealth of authorty. This may be men-
tioned as one of the few American cases which accept to the full
extent the doctrine of the Gage Case.
The case of Lough v. Outerbridge,1 decided in an im-
portant commercial jurisdiction, has been confidently cited by
courts and writers who adhere to the view of the Gage Case.
It becomes important, therefore, to consider the ground of that
decision. A certain steamship company offered a reduced rate
to all who would patronize their ships exclusively 1while a com-
petitor's ship was in port This privilege was extended to all
shippers under the same conditions. The court held that a
shipper who patronized both the carrier in question ind his com-
petitor could not insist upon the lower rate. While the Gage
Case was quoted by the court, the language of Mr. Justice
O'Brien leaves beyond doubt the basis of the decision' He
said: "If the general rates are reasonable a deviation from the
standard by the carrier in favor of partictlar customers, for
special reasons, not applicable to the whole public, does not fur-
nish to parties not similarly situated any just grounds for com-
plaint- When the conditions and circumstances are identical the
charges to all shippers for the same service must be equal." The
decision was arrived it on the ground that the rcbate offered
was not exclusive but was available to all upon the same con;
ditions, and because the presence of competition justified this
regulation on the part of the carrier. That the.rule was fully
accepted in New York is further indicated by a decision of the
Court of Appeals of that state five years earlier in which the
Concord & Portsmouth I. R. v. Forsaith, So N. H. ia2 (1875) ; Hous-
ton etc Ry. v. Rust. ;8 Tex. 98 (1882); Scofield v. Railway Co, 43 Ohio
571 :88); I. D. & S. R. R. v. Ervin, 118 IlL 250 (18); _.-zera v.
G And Trunk Ry, 63 Vt. 169 (189o For a mrodem case confta -.,an
e-tesive review of the subject, see Mo. K. & T. Ry. v. New Em Millin
Co., 8o Kan. 141 (909).
143 N. Y. 27 (1894)-
On p. m.6
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right of a carrier to make unjust discriminations either in serv-
ice or in rates was denied. 38
From the entire investigation it may safely be concluded
that there grew up in America a common law doctrine prohibit-
ing' unjust discrimination as early as 1863. While legislation
to define and enforce the obligation appeared here much later
than in England, the American courts had embodied the sub-
stance of what has become the modern statutory obligation into
a common law rule. It represents a natural expansion of the
obligations of public servants to satisfy a demand and correct
an abuse which were the creatures of new and increasingly com-
plicated conditions. And it further appears, upon close analysis
of the decisions, that the English view, as announced in the Gage
Case, has never acquired a real following among the cases, and
ce.nnot be said to have made any real impression upon the
American common law.
Benjamin M. Kline.
Law School, University of Pennsylvania.
i"Root v. L LR. R. Co., 14 N. Y. 3oo (t889). In this case an interest-
ing situation is presented. A rebate on freight was offered in consideration
of the erection .by the shipper of a dock which the railroad could use. A suit
for the recovery of the rebates was successful. The court said that while
the rebate standing alone would amount to an unjust discrimination, since it
was founded upon valuable consideration the contract would be enforced.
The custom of giving rebates for consideration of indefinite value such as
that in this case, later developed into a convenient cloak for unjust prefer-
ences, and the tendency of the courts under modern statutes is to frown upon
it. At this time, however, it was held legitimate.
